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Abstract. Verifying hyperproperties at runtime is a challenging prob-
lem as hyperproperties, such as non-interference and observational de-
terminism, relate multiple computation traces with each other. It is nec-
essary to store previously seen traces, because every new incoming trace
needs to be compatible with every run of the system observed so far. Fur-
thermore, the new incoming trace poses requirements on future traces. In
our monitoring approach, we focus on those requirements by rewriting a
hyperproperty in the temporal logic HyperLTL to a Boolean constraint
system. A hyperproperty is then violated by multiple runs of the system if
the constraint system becomes unsatisfiable. We compare our implemen-
tation, which utilizes either BDDs or a SAT solver to store and evaluate
constraints, to the automata-based monitoring tool RVHyper.
Keywords: monitoring · rewriting · constraint-based · hyperproperties.
1 Introduction
As today’s complex and large-scale systems are usually far beyond the scope
of classic verification techniques like model checking or theorem proving, we
are in the need of light-weight monitors for controlling the flow of information.
By instrumenting efficient monitoring techniques in such systems that oper-
ate in an unpredictable privacy-critical environment, countermeasures will be
enacted before irreparable information leaks happen. Information-flow policies,
however, cannot be monitored with standard runtime verification techniques
as they relate multiple runs of a system. For example, observational determin-
ism [19, 21, 24] is a policy stating that altering non-observable input has no
impact on the observable behavior. Hyperproperties [7] are a generalization of
trace properties and are thus capable of expressing information-flow policies.
HyperLTL [6] is a recently introduced temporal logic for hyperproperties, which
? This work was partially supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) as
part of the Collaborative Research Center “Methods and Tools for Understanding
and Controlling Privacy” (CRC 1223) and the Collaborative Research Center “Foun-
dations of Perspicuous Software Systems” (CRC 248), and by the European Research
Council (ERC) Grant OSARES (No. 683300).
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
13
51
7v
1 
 [c
s.L
O]
  3
1 M
ay
 20
19
2 C. Hahn, M. Stenger, L. Tentrup
extends Linear-time Temporal Logic (LTL) [20] with trace variables and ex-
plicit trace quantification. Observational determinism is expressed as the for-
mula ∀pi, pi′. (outpi ↔ outpi′)W(inpi = inpi′), stating that all traces pi, pi′ should
agree on the output as long as they agree on the inputs.
In contrast to classic trace property monitoring, where a single run suffices
to determine a violation, in runtime verification of HyperLTL formulas, we are
concerned whether a set of runs through a system violates a given specifica-
tion. In the common setting, those runs are given sequentially to the runtime
monitor [1,2,12,13], which determines if the given set of runs violates the specifi-
cation. An alternative view on HyperLTL monitoring is that every new incoming
trace poses requirements on future traces. For example, the event {in, out} in
the observational determinism example above asserts that for every other trace,
the output out has to be enabled if in is enabled. Approaches based on static
automata constructions [1, 12, 13] perform very well on this type of specifica-
tions, although their scalability is intrinsically limited by certain parameters:
The automaton construction becomes a bottleneck for more complex specifica-
tions, especially with respect to the number of atomic propositions. Furthermore,
the computational workload grows steadily with the number of incoming traces,
as every trace seen so far has to be checked against every new trace. Even opti-
mizations [12], which minimize the amount of traces that must be stored, turn
out to be too coarse grained as the following example shows. Consider the moni-
toring of the HyperLTL formula ∀pi, pi′. (api → ¬bpi′), which states that globally
if a occurs on any trace pi, then b is not allowed to hold on any trace pi′, on the
following incoming traces:
{a} {} {} {} ¬b is enforced on the 1st pos. (1)
{a} {a} {} {} ¬b is enforced on the 1st and 2nd pos. (2)
{a} {} {a} {} ¬b is enforced on the 1st and 3rd pos. (3)
In prior work [12], we observed that traces, which pose less requirements on
future traces, can safely be discarded from the monitoring process. In the ex-
ample above, the requirements of trace 1 are dominated by the requirements of
trace 2, namely that b is not allowed to hold on the first and second position of
new incoming traces. Hence, trace 1 must not longer be stored in order to de-
tect a violation. But with the proposed language inclusion check in [12], neither
trace 2 nor trace 3 can be discarded, as they pose incomparable requirements.
They have, however, overlapping constraints, that is, they both enforce ¬b in
the first step.
To further improve the conciseness of the stored traces information, we use
rewriting, which is a more fine-grained monitoring approach. The basic idea is
to track the requirements that future traces have to fulfill, instead of storing
a set of traces. In the example above, we would track the requirement that
b is not allowed to hold on the first three positions of every freshly incoming
trace. Rewriting has been applied successfully to trace properties, namely LTL
formulas [17]. The idea is to partially evaluate a given LTL specification ϕ on an
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incoming event by unrolling ϕ according to the expansion laws of the temporal
operators. The result of a single rewrite is again an LTL formula representing
the updated specification, which the continuing execution has to satisfy. We use
rewriting techniques to reduce ∀2HyperLTL formulas to LTL constraints and
check those constraints for inconsistencies corresponding to violations.
In this paper, we introduce a complete and provably correct rewriting-
based monitoring approach for ∀2HyperLTL formulas. Our algorithm rewrites
a HyperLTL formula and a single event into a constraint composed of plain
LTL and HyperLTL. For example, assume the event {in, out} while monitor-
ing observational determinism formalized above. The first step of the rewrit-
ing applies the expansion laws for the temporal operators, which results in
(inpi = inpi′) ∨ (outpi ↔ outpi′) ∧ ((outpi ↔ outpi′)W(inpi = inpi′)). The event
{in, out} is rewritten for atomic propositions indexed by the trace variable pi.
This means replacing each occurrence of in or out in the current expansion step,
i.e., before the operator, with >. Additionally, we strip the pi′ trace quantifier
in the current expansion step from all other atomic propositions. This leaves us
with (> = in) ∨ (> ↔ out) ∧ ((outpi ↔ outpi′)W(inpi = inpi′)). After sim-
plification we have ¬in ∨ out ∧ ((outpi ↔ outpi′)W(inpi = inpi′)) as the new
specification, which consists of a plain LTL part and a HyperLTL part. Based
on this, we incrementally build a Boolean constraint system: we start by encod-
ing the constraints corresponding to the LTL part and encode the HyperLTL
part as variables. Those variables will then be incrementally defined when more
elements of the trace become available. With this approach, we solely store the
necessary information needed to detect violations of a given hyperproperty.
We evaluate two implementations of our approach, based on BDDs and SAT-
solving, against RVHyper [13], a highly optimized automaton-based monitoring
tool for temporal hyperproperties. Our experiments show that the rewriting
approach performs equally well in general and better on a class of formulas
which we call guarded invariants, i.e., formulas that define a certain invariant
relation between two traces.
Related Work. With the need to express temporal hyperproperties in a suc-
cinct and formal manner, the above mentioned temporal logics HyperLTL and
HyperCTL* [6] have been proposed. The model-checking [6, 14, 15], satisfiabil-
ity [9], and realizability problem [10] of HyperLTL has been studied before.
Runtime verification of HyperLTL formulas was first considered for (co-)k-
safety hyperproperties [1]. In the same paper, the notion of monitorability for
HyperLTL was introduced. The authors have also identified syntactic classes
of HyperLTL formulas that are monitorable and they proposed a monitoring
algorithm based on a progression logic expressing trace interdependencies and
the composition of an LTL3 monitor.
Another automata-based approach for monitoring HyperLTL formulas was
proposed in [12]. Given a HyperLTL specification, the algorithm starts by cre-
ating a deterministic monitor automaton. For every incoming trace it is then
checked that all combinations with the already seen traces are accepted by
the automaton. In order to minimize the number of stored traces, a language-
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inclusion-based algorithm is proposed, which allows to prune traces with re-
dundant information. Furthermore, a method to reduce the number of combi-
nation of traces which have to get checked by analyzing the specification for
relations such as reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity with a HyperLTL-SAT
solver [9, 11], is proposed. The algorithm is implemented in the tool RVHy-
per [13], which was used to monitor information-flow policies and to detect spu-
rious dependencies in hardware designs.
Another rewriting-based monitoring approach for HyperLTL is outlined
in [5]. The idea is to identify a set of propositions of interest and aggregate
constraints such that inconsistencies in the constraints indicate a violation of
the HyperLTL formula. While the paper describes the building blocks for such
a monitoring approach with a number of examples, we have, unfortunately, not
been successful in applying the algorithm to other hyperproperties of interest,
such as observational determinism.
In [3], the authors study the complexity of monitoring hyperproperties. They
show that the form and size of the input, as well as the formula have a sig-
nificant impact on the feasibility of the monitoring process. They differentiate
between several input forms and study their complexity: a set of linear traces,
tree-shaped Kripke structures, and acyclic Kripke structures. For acyclic struc-
tures and alternation-free HyperLTL formulas, the problems complexity gets as
low as NC.
In [4], the authors discuss examples where static analysis can be combined
with runtime verification techniques to monitor HyperLTL formulas beyond the
alternation-free fragment. They discuss the challenges in monitoring formulas
beyond this fragment and lay the foundations towards a general method.
2 Preliminaries
Let AP be a finite set of atomic propositions and let Σ = 2AP be the correspond-
ing alphabet. An infinite trace t ∈ Σω is an infinite sequence over the alphabet.
A subset T ⊆ Σω is called a trace property. A hyperproperty H ⊆ 2(Σω) is a
generalization of a trace property. A finite trace t ∈ Σ+ is a finite sequence
over Σ. In the case of finite traces, |t| denotes the length of a trace. We use the
following notation to access and manipulate traces: Let t be a trace and i be a
natural number. t[i] denotes the i-th element of t. Therefore, t[0] represents the
first element of the trace. Let j be natural number. If j ≥ i and i ≥ |t|, then
t[i, j] denotes the sequence t[i]t[i + 1] · · · t[min(j, |t| − 1)]. Otherwise it denotes
the empty trace . t[i〉 denotes the suffix of t starting at position i. For two finite
traces s and t, we denote their concatenation by s · t.
HyperLTL Syntax. HyperLTL [6] extends LTL with trace variables and trace
quantifiers. Let V be a finite set of trace variables. The syntax of HyperLTL is
given by the grammar
ϕ := ∀pi. ϕ | ∃pi. ϕ | ψ
ψ := api | ψ ∧ ψ | ¬ψ | ψ | ψ U ψ ,
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where a ∈ AP is an atomic proposition and pi ∈ V is a trace variable. Atomic
propositions are indexed by trace variables. The explicit trace quantification
enables us to express properties like “on all traces ϕ must hold”, expressed by
∀pi. ϕ. Dually, we can express “there exists a trace such that ϕ holds”, expressed
by ∃pi. ϕ. We use the standard derived operators release ϕRψ := ¬(¬ϕU ¬ψ),
eventually ϕ := true U ϕ, globally ϕ := ¬ ¬ϕ, and weak until ϕ1W ϕ2 :=
(ϕ1 U ϕ2) ∨ ϕ1. As we use the finite trace semantics, ϕ denotes the strong
version of the next operator, i.e., if a trace ends before the satisfaction of ϕ
can be determined, the satisfaction relation, defined below, evaluates to false.
To enable duality in the finite trace setting, we additionally use the weak next
operator ϕ which evaluates to true if a trace ends before the satisfaction of ϕ
can be determined and is defined as ϕ := ¬ ¬ϕ. We call ψ of a HyperLTL
formula Q.ψ, with an arbitrary quantifier prefix Q, the body of the formula. A
HyperLTL formula Q.ψ is in the alternation-free fragment if either Q consists
solely of universal quantifiers or solely of existential quantifiers. We also denote
the respective alternation-free fragments as the ∀n fragment and the ∃n fragment,
with n being the number of quantifiers in the prefix.
Finite Trace Semantics. We recap the finite trace semantics for HyperLTL [5]
which is itself based on the finite trace semantics of LTL [18]. In the following,
when using L(ϕ) we refer to the finite trace semantics of a HyperLTL formula
ϕ. Let Πfin : V → Σ+ be a partial function mapping trace variables to finite
traces. We define [0] as the empty set. Πfin [i〉 denotes the trace assignment that
is equal to Πfin(pi)[i〉 for all pi ∈ dom(Πfin). By slight abuse of notation, we write
t ∈ Πfin to access traces t in the image of Πfin . The satisfaction of a HyperLTL
formula ϕ over a finite trace assignment Πfin and a set of finite traces T , denoted
by Πfin T ϕ, is defined as follows:
Πfin T api if a ∈ Πfin(pi)[0]
Πfin T ¬ϕ if Πfin 2T ϕ
Πfin T ϕ ∨ ψ if Πfin T ϕ or Πfin T ψ
Πfin T ϕ if ∀t ∈ Πfin . |t| > 1 and Πfin [1〉 T ϕ
Πfin T ϕU ψ if ∃i < mint∈Πfin |t|. Πfin [i〉 T ψ ∧ ∀j < i.Πfin [j〉 T ϕ
Πfin T ∃pi. ϕ if there is some t ∈ T such that Πfin [pi 7→ t] T ϕ
Πfin T ∀pi. ϕ if for all t ∈ T such that Πfin [pi 7→ t] T ϕ
Due to duality of U/R, / , ∃/∀, and the standard Boolean operators, every
HyperLTL formula ϕ can be transformed into negation normal form (NNF), i.e.,
for every ϕ there is some ψ in negation normal form such that for all Πfin and T
it holds that Πfin T ϕ if, and only if, Πfin T ψ. The standard LTL semantic,
written t LTLfin ϕ, for some LTL formula ϕ is equal to {pi 7→ t}fin ∅ ϕ′, where
ϕ′ is derived from ϕ by replacing every proposition p ∈ AP by ppi.
3 Rewriting HyperLTL
Given the body ϕ of a ∀2HyperLTL formula ∀pi, pi′. ϕ, and a finite trace t ∈ Σ+,
we define alternative language characterizations. These capture the intuitive idea
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that, if one fixes a finite trace t, the language of ∀pi, pi′. ϕ includes exactly those
traces t′ that satisfy ϕ in conjunction with t.
Lpit (ϕ) :=
{
t′ ∈ Σ+| {pi 7→ t, pi′ 7→ t′}fin  ϕ
}
Lpi′t (ϕ) :=
{
t′ ∈ Σ+| {pi 7→ t′, pi′ 7→ t}fin  ϕ
}
Lt(ϕ) := Lpit (ϕ) ∩ Lpi
′
t (ϕ)
We call ϕˆ := ϕ ∧ ϕ[pi′/pi, pi/pi′] the symmetric closure of ϕ, where ϕ[pi′/pi, pi/pi′]
represents the expression ϕ in which the trace variables pi, pi′ are swapped. The
language of the symmetric closure, when fixing one trace variable, is equivalent
to the language of ϕ.
Lemma 1. Given the body ϕ of a ∀2HyperLTL formula ∀pi, pi′. ϕ, and a finite
trace t ∈ Σ+, it holds that Lpit (ϕˆ) = Lt(ϕ).
Proof.
Lpit (ϕˆ) =
{
t′ ∈ Σ+| {pi 7→ t, pi′ 7→ t′}fin  ϕˆ
}
=
{
t′ ∈ Σ+| {pi 7→ t, pi′ 7→ t′}fin  ϕ ∧ ϕ[pi′/pi, pi/pi′]
}
=
{
t′ ∈ Σ+| {pi 7→ t, pi′ 7→ t′}fin  ϕ, {pi 7→ t, pi′ 7→ t′}fin  ϕ[pi′/pi, pi/pi′]
}
=
{
t′ ∈ Σ+| {pi 7→ t, pi′ 7→ t′}fin  ϕ, {pi 7→ t′, pi′ 7→ t}fin  ϕ
}
= Lt(ϕ)
We exploit this to rewrite a ∀2HyperLTL formula into an LTL formula. We define
the projection ϕ|pit of the body ϕ of a ∀2HyperLTL formula ∀pi, pi′. ϕ in NNF and
a finite trace t ∈ Σ+ to an LTL formula recursively on the structure of ϕ:
api|pit :=
{
> if a ∈ t[0]
⊥ otherwise ¬api|
pi
t :=
{
> if a /∈ t[0]
⊥ otherwise
api′ |pit := a ¬api′ |pit := ¬a
(ϕ ∨ ψ)|pit := ϕ|pit ∨ ψ|pit (ϕ ∧ ψ)|pit := ϕ|pit ∧ ψ|pit
( ϕ)|pit :=
{
⊥ if |t| ≤ 1
ϕ|pit[1〉 otherwise
( ϕ)|pit :=
{
> if |t| ≤ 1
ϕ|pit[1〉 otherwise
(ϕU ψ)|pit :=
{
ψ|pit if |t| ≤ 1
ψ|pit ∨ (ϕ|pit ∧ ((ϕU ψ)|pit[1〉)) otherwise
(ϕRψ)|pit :=
{
ψ|pit if |t| ≤ 1
ψ|pit ∧ (ϕ|pit ∨ ((ϕRψ)|pit[1〉)) otherwise
Theorem 1. Given a ∀2HyperLTL formula ∀pi, pi′. ϕ and any two finite traces
t, t′ ∈ Σ+ it holds that t′ ∈ Lpit (ϕ) if, and only if t′ LTLfin ϕ|pit .
Proof. By induction on the size of t. Induction Base (t = e, where e ∈ Σ):
Let t′ ∈ Σ+ be arbitrarily chosen. We distinguish by structural induction the
following cases over the formula ϕ. We begin with the base cases.
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– api: we know by definition that api|pit equals > if a ∈ t[0] and ⊥ otherwise, so
it follows that t′ LTLfin api|pit ⇔ a ∈ t[0]⇔ t′ ∈ Lpit (api).
– api′ : t
′ ∈ Lpit (api′)⇔ a ∈ t′[0]⇔ t′ LTLfin a⇔ t′ LTLfin api′ |pit .
– ¬api and ¬api′ are proven analogously.
The structural induction hypothesis states that ∀t′ ∈ Σ+. t′ ∈ Lpit (ψ) ⇔
t′ LTLfin ψ|pit (SIH1) , where ψ is a strict subformula of ϕ.
– ϕ ∨ ψ: t′ ∈ Lpit (ϕ ∨ ψ) ⇔ (t′ ∈ Lpit (ϕ)) ∨ (t′ ∈ Lpit (ψ)) SIH1⇐=⇒ (t′ LTLfin
ϕ|pit ) ∨ (t′ LTLfin ψ|pit )⇔ t′ LTLfin (ϕ ∨ ψ)|pit .
– ϕ: t′ ∈ Lpit ( ϕ)
|t|=1⇐=⇒ ⊥ |t|=1⇐=⇒ t′ LTLfin ( ϕ)|pit .
– ϕU ψ: t′ ∈ Lpit (ϕU ψ)
|t|=1⇐=⇒ t′ ∈ Lpit (ψ) SIH1⇐=⇒ t′ LTLfin ψ|pit
|t|=1⇐=⇒ t′ LTLfin
(ϕU ψ)|pit .
– ϕ ∧ ψ, ϕ and ϕRψ are proven analogously.
Induction Step (t = e·t∗, where e ∈ Σ, t∗ ∈ Σ+): The induction hypothesis states
that ∀t′ ∈ Σ+. t′ ∈ Lpit∗(ϕ) ⇔ t′ LTLfin ϕ|pit∗ (IH). We make use of structural
induction over ϕ. All cases without temporal operators are covered as their
proofs above were independent of |t|. The structural induction hypothesis states
for all strict subformulas ψ that ∀t′ ∈ Σ+. t′ ∈ Lpit (ψ)⇔ t′ LTLfin ψ|pit (SIH2).
– ϕ: t′ ∈ Lpit∗( ϕ)
|t∗|≥2⇐==⇒ t′[1〉 ∈ Lpit (ϕ) IH⇐⇒ t′[1〉 LTLfin ϕ|pit ⇔ t′ LTLfin
(ϕ|pit ) t
∗=e·t⇐==⇒ t′ LTLfin ( ϕ)|pit∗ .
– ϕU ψ: t′ ∈ Lpit∗(ϕU ψ)
|t∗|≥2⇐==⇒ (t′ ∈ Lpit∗(ψ)) ∨ (t′ ∈ Lpit∗(ϕ)) ∧ (t′[1〉 ∈
Lpit (ϕU ψ)) SIH2+IH⇐====⇒ (t′ LTLfin ψ|pit∗)∨(t′  ϕ|pit∗)∧(t′[1〉 LTLfin (ϕU ψ)|pit )⇔
(t′ LTLfin ψ|pit∗)∨(t′  ϕ|pit∗)∧(t′ LTLfin ((ϕU ψ)|pit ))⇔ t′ LTLfin (ϕU ψ)|pit∗ .
– ϕ and ϕRψ are proven analogously.
4 Constraint-based Monitoring
For monitoring, we need to define an incremental rewriting that accurately mod-
els the semantics of ϕ|pit while still being able to detect violations early. To this
end, we define an operation ϕ[pi, e, i], where e ∈ Σ is an event and i is the current
position in the trace. ϕ[pi, e, i] transforms ϕ into a propositional formula, where
the variables are either indexed atomic propositions pi for p ∈ AP , or a variable
v−ϕ′,i+1 and v
+
ϕ′,i+1 that act as placeholders until new information about the trace
comes in. Whenever the next event e′ occurs, the variables are defined with the
result of ϕ′[pi, e′, i+1]. If the trace ends, the variables are set to true and false for
v+ and v−, respectively. We define ϕ[pi, e, i] of a ∀2HyperLTL formula ∀pi, pi′. ϕ
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in NNF, event e ∈ Σ, and i ≥ 0 recursively on the structure of the body ϕ:
api[pi, e, i] :=
{
> if a ∈ e
⊥ otherwise (¬api)[pi, e, i] :=
{
> if a /∈ e
⊥ otherwise
api′ [pi, e, i] := ai (¬api′)[pi, e, i] := ¬ai
(ϕ ∨ ψ)[pi, e, i] := ϕ[pi, e, i] ∨ ψ[pi, e, i] (ϕ ∧ ψ)[pi, e, i] := ϕ[pi, e, i] ∧ ψ[pi, e, i]
( ϕ)[pi, e, i] := v−ϕ,i+1 ( ϕ)[pi, e, i] := v
+
ϕ,i+1
(ϕU ψ)[pi, e, i] := ψ[pi, e, i] ∨ (ϕ[pi, e, i] ∧ v−ϕU ψ,i+1)
(ϕRψ)[pi, e, i] := ψ[pi, e, i] ∧ (ϕ[pi, e, i] ∨ v+ϕRψ,i+1)
We encode a ∀2HyperLTL formula and finite traces into a constraint system,
which, as we will show, is satisfiable if and only if the given traces satisfy the
formula w.r.t. the finite semantics of HyperLTL. We write vϕ,i to denote either
v−ϕ,i or v
+
ϕ,i. For e ∈ Σ and t ∈ Σ∗, we define
constr(v+ϕ,i, ) := >
constr(v−ϕ,i, ) := ⊥
constr(vϕ,i, e · t) := ϕ[pi, e, i] ∧
∧
vψ,i+1∈ϕ[pi,e,i]
(
vψ,i+1→ constr(vψ,i+1, t)
)
enciAP() := >
enciAP(e · t) :=
∧
a∈AP∩e
ai ∧
∧
a∈AP\e
¬ai ∧ enci+1AP (t) ,
where we use vψ,i+1 ∈ ϕ[pi, e, i] to denote variables vψ,i+1 occurring in the
propositional formula ϕ[pi, e, i]. enc is used to transform a trace into a propo-
sitional formula, e.g., enc0{a,b}({a}{a, b}) = a0 ∧ ¬b0 ∧ a1 ∧ b1. For n = 0
we omit the annotation, i.e., we write encAP(t) instead of enc
0
AP(t). Also we
omit the index AP if it is clear from the context. By slight abuse of no-
tation, we use constrn(ϕ, t) for some quantifier free HyperLTL formula ϕ
to denote constr(vϕ,n, t) if |t| > 0. For a trace t′ ∈ Σ+, we use the no-
tation enc(t′)  constr(ϕ, t), which evaluates to true if, and only if enc(t′) ∧
constr(ϕ, t) is satisfiable.
4.1 Algorithm
Figure 1 depicts our constraint-based algorithm. Note that this algorithm can
be used in an offline and online fashion. Before we give algorithmic details, con-
sider again, the observational determinism example from the introduction, which
is expressed as ∀2HyperLTL formula ∀pi, pi′. (outpi ↔ outpi′)W(inpi = inpi′).
The basic idea of the algorithm is to transform the HyperLTL formula to
a formula consisting partially of LTL, which expresses the requirements of
the incoming trace in the current step, and partially of HyperLTL. Assum-
ing the event {in, out}, we transform the observational determinism formula
to the following formula: ¬in ∨ out ∧ ((outpi ↔ outpi′)W(inpi = inpi′)).
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Input : ∀pi, pi′. ϕ, T ⊆ Σ+
Output: violation or no violation
1 ψ := nnf(ϕˆ)
2 C := >
3 foreach t ∈ T do
4 Ct := vψ,0
5 tenc := >
6 while ei := getNextEvent(t) do
7 tenc := tenc ∧ enci(ei)
8 foreach vφ,i ∈ Ct do
9 c := φ[pi, ei, i]
10 Ct := Ct ∧ (vφ,i→ c)
11 if ¬sat(C ∧ Ct ∧ tenc) then
12 return violation
13 foreach v+φ,i+1 ∈ Ct do
14 Ct := Ct ∧ v+φ,i+1
15 foreach v−φ,i+1 ∈ Ct do
16 Ct := Ct ∧ ¬v−φ,i+1
17 C := C ∧ Ct
18 return no violation
Fig. 1: Constraint-based algorithm for
monitoring ∀2HyperLTL formulas.
A Boolean constraint system is then
build incrementally: we start encod-
ing the constraints corresponding to
the LTL part (in front of the next-
operator) and encode the Hyper-
LTL part (after the next-operator)
as variables that are defined when
more events of the trace come in.
We continue by explaining the algo-
rithm in detail. In line 1, we con-
struct ψ as the negation normal
form of the symmetric closure of the
original formula. We build two con-
straint systems: C containing con-
straints of previous traces and Ct
(built incrementally) containing the
constraints for the current trace t.
Consequently, we initialize C with >
and Ct with vψ,0 (lines 2 and 4). If
the trace ends, we define the remain-
ing v variables according to their po-
larities and add Ct to C. For each
new event ei in the trace t, and each
“open” constraint in Ct correspond-
ing to step i, i.e., vφ,i ∈ Ct, we
rewrite the formula φ (line 9) and
define vφ,i with the rewriting result,
which, potentially introduced new open constraints vφ′,i+1 for the next step
i + 1. The constraint encoding of the current trace is aggregated in constraint
tenc (line 7). If the constraint system given the encoding of the current trace
turns out to be unsatisfiable, a violation to the specification is detected, which
is then returned.
In the following, we sketch two algorithmic improvements. First, instead of
storing the constraints corresponding to traces individually, we use a new data
structure, which is a tree maintaining nodes of formulas, their corresponding
variables and also child nodes. Such a node corresponds to already seen rewrites.
The initial node captures the (transformed) specification (similar to line 4) and
it is also the root of the tree structure, representing all the generated constraints
which replaces C in Fig. 1. Whenever a trace deviates in its rewrite result a
new child or branch is added to the tree. If a rewrite result is already present
in the node tree structure there is no need to create any new constraints nor
new variables. This is crucial in case we observe many equal traces or traces
behaving effectively the same. In case no new constraints were added to the
constraint system, we omit a superfluous check for satisfiability.
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Second, we use conjunct splitting to utilize the node tree optimization even
more. We illustrate the basic idea on an example. Consider ∀pi, pi′. ϕ with ϕ =
((api ↔ a′pi)∨(bpi ↔ b′pi)), which demands that on all executions on each position
at least on of propositions a or b agree in its evaluation. Consider the two traces
t1 = {a}{a}{a}, t2 = {a}{a, b}{a} that satisfy the specification. As both traces
feature the same first event, they also share the same rewrite result for the first
position. Interestingly, on the second position, we get (a ∨ ¬b) ∧ sϕ for t1 and
(a ∨ b) ∧ sϕ for t2 as the rewrite results. While these constraints are no longer
equal, by the nature of invariants, both feature the same subterm on the right
hand side of the conjunction. We split the resulting constraint on its syntactic
structure, such that we would no longer have to introduce a branch in the tree.
4.2 Correctness
In this technical subsection, we will formally prove correctness of our algorithm
by showing that our incremental construction of the Boolean constraints is eq-
uisatisfiable to the HyperLTL rewriting presented in Section 3. We begin by
showing that satisfiability is preserved when shifting the indices, as stated by
the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For any ∀2HyperLTL formula ∀pi, pi′. ϕ over atomic propositions
AP, any finite traces t, t′ ∈ Σ+ and n ≥ 0 it holds that encAP(t′) 
constr(ϕ, t)⇔ encnAP(t′)  constrn(ϕ, t).
Proof. By renaming of the positional indices.
In the following lemma and corollary, we show that the semantics of the next
operators matches the finite LTL semantics.
Lemma 3. For any ∀2HyperLTL formula ∀pi, pi′. ϕ over atomic propositions AP
and any finite traces t, t′ ∈ Σ+ it holds that enc(t′)  constr( ϕ, t)⇔ enc(t′) 
constr(v−ϕ,1, t[1〉)⇔ enc(t′[1〉)  constr(v−ϕ,0, t[1〉).
Proof. Let ϕ, t, t′ be given. It holds that constr( ϕ, t) = constr(v−ϕ,1, t[1〉)
by definition. As constr(v−ϕ,1, t[1〉) by construction does not contain any vari-
ables with positional index 0, we only need to check satisfiablity with respect
to enc(t′[1〉). Thus enc(t′)  constr( ϕ, t) ⇔ enc(t′)  constr(v−ψ,1, t[1〉) ⇔
enc1(t′[1〉)  constr(v−ϕ,1, t[1〉) Lem2⇐==⇒ enc(t′[1〉)  constr(v−ϕ,0, t[1〉).
Corollary 1. For any ∀2HyperLTL formula ∀pi, pi′. ϕ over atomic propositions
AP and any finite traces t, t′ ∈ Σ+ it holds that enc(t′)  constr( ϕ, t) ⇔
enc(t′)  constr(v+ϕ,1, t[1〉)⇔ enc(t′[1〉)  constr(v+ϕ,0, t[1〉).
We will now state the correctness theorem, namely that our algorithm preserves
the HyperLTL rewriting semantics.
Theorem 2. For every ∀2HyperLTL formula ∀pi, pi′. ϕ in negation normal form
over atomic propositions AP and any finite trace t ∈ Σ+ it holds that ∀t′ ∈
Σ+. t′ LTLfin ϕ|pit ⇔ encAP(t′)  constr(ϕ, t).
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Proof. By induction over the size of t. Induction Base (t = e, where e ∈ Σ): We
choose t′ ∈ Σ+ arbitrarily. We distinguish by structural induction the following
cases over the formula ϕ:
– api: constr(api, e) = (api)[pi, e, 0] = > if, and only if, a ∈ e. Thus enc(t′) 
constr(api, e)⇔ a ∈ e⇔ t′ LTLfin api|pie .
– api′ : constr(api′ , e) = (api′)[pi, e, 0] = a0 Thus enc(t
′)  constr(api′ , e) ⇔
enc(t′)  a0 def enc⇐===⇒ a ∈ t′[0]⇔ t′ LTLfin a
def |pi⇐==⇒ t′ LTLfin api′ |pie .
– ¬api and ¬api′ are proven analogously.
The structural induction hypothesis states that ∀t′ ∈ Σ+. t′ LTLfin ψ|pit ⇔
enc(t′)  constr(ψ, t) (SIH1), where ψ is a strict subformula of ϕ.
– ϕ∨ψ: t′ LTLfin (ϕ∨ψ)|pie ⇔ (t′ LTLfin ϕ|pie )∨ (t′ LTLfin ψ|pie ) SIH1⇐=⇒ (enc(t′) 
constr(ϕ, e)) ∨ (enc(t′)  constr(ψ, e)) ⇔ (enc(t′)  ϕ[pi, e, 0]) ∨ (enc(t′) 
ψ[pi, e, 0])⇔ enc(t′)  ϕ[pi, e, 0]∨ψ[pi, e, 0] def enc⇐===⇒ enc(t′)  (ϕ∨ψ)[pi, e, 0]⇔
enc(t′)  constr(ϕ ∨ ψ, e).
– ϕ: constr( ϕ, e) = ( ϕ)[pi, e, 0] = v−ϕ,0 ∧ (v−ϕ,0 → constr(v−ϕ,0, )) = ⊥.
Thus t′ LTLfin ( ϕ)|pie = ⊥ ⇔ enc(t′)  ⊥.
– ϕU ψ: constr(ϕU ψ, e) = (ϕU ψ)[pi, e, 0] = ψ[pi, e, 0] ∨ (ϕ[pi, e, 0] ∧
constr(v−ϕU ψ,0, )) = ψ[pi, e, 0] = constr(ψ, e). Thus t
′ LTLfin
(ϕU ψ)|pie LTLfin ψ|pie SIH1⇐=⇒ enc(t′)  constr(ψ, e).
– ϕ ∧ ψ, ϕ, and ϕRψ are proven analogously.
Induction Step (t = e · t∗, where e ∈ Σ and t∗ ∈ Σ+): The induction hypothesis
states that ∀t′ ∈ Σ+. t′ LTLfin ϕ|pit∗ ⇔ enc(t′)  constr(ϕ, t∗) (IH). We make use
of structural induction over ϕ. All base cases are covered as their proofs above
are independent of |t|. The structural induction hypothesis states for all strict
subformulas ψ that ∀t′ ∈ Σ+. t′ LTLfin ψ|pit ⇔ enc(t′)  constr(ψ, t).
– ϕ ∨ ψ:
t′ LTLfin (ϕ ∨ ψ)|pit ⇔ t′ LTLfin ϕ|pit ∨ t′ LTLfin ψ|pit
SIH1⇐=⇒ enc(t′)  constr(ϕ, t) ∨ enc(t′)  constr(ψ, t)
t=e·t∗⇐==⇒ enc(t′)  (ϕ[pi, e, 0] ∧ ∧
vϕ′,1∈ϕ[pi,e,0]
vϕ′,1→ constr(vϕ′,1, t∗))
∨ enc(t′)  (ψ[pi, e, 0] ∧ ∧
vψ′,1∈ϕ[pi,e,0]
vψ′,1→ constr(vψ′,1, t∗))
†⇐⇒ enc(t′)  (ϕ[pi, e, 0] ∨ ψ[pi, e, 0])
∧ ∧
vϕ′,1∈ϕ[pi,e,0]
vϕ′,1→ constr(vϕ′,1, t∗)
∧ ∧
vψ′,1∈ϕ[pi,e,0]
vψ′,1→ constr(vψ′,1, t∗)
⇔ enc(t′)  (ϕ ∨ ψ)[pi, e, 0]
∧ ∧
vφ,1∈(ϕ∨ψ)[pi,e,0]
vφ,1→ constr(vφ,1, t∗)
t=e·t∗⇐==⇒ enc(t′)  constr(ϕ ∨ ψ, t)
†: ⇐: trivial, ⇒: Assume a model Mϕ for enc(t′)  ϕ[pi, e, 0] ∧ A. By con-
struction, constraints by ϕ do not share variable with constraints by ψ. We
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extend the model by assigning vψ′,1 with ⊥, for all vψ′,1 ∈ ψ[pi, e, 0] and
assigning the rest of the variables in ψ[pi, e, 0] arbitrarily.
– ϕ: t′ LTLfin ( ϕ)|pit ⇔ t′ LTLfin ϕ|pit∗ ⇔ t′[1〉 LTLfin ϕ|pit∗ IH⇐⇒
enc(t′[1〉)  constr(ϕ, t∗) Lem3⇐==⇒ enc(t′)  constr( ϕ, t).
– ϕU ψ:
t′ LTLfin (ϕU ψ)|pit
⇔ t′ LTLfin ψ|pit ∨
[
t′ LTLfin ϕ|pit ∧ t′[1〉 LTLfin (ϕU ψ)|pit∗
]
SIH1+IH,L3⇐======⇒ enc(t′)  constr(ψ, t)
∨
[
enc(t′)  constr(ϕ, t) ∧ enc(t′)  constr(v−ϕU ψ,1, t∗)
]
⇔ enc(t′)  (ψ[pi, e, 0] ∧ ∧
vψ′,1∈ψ[pi,e,0]
vψ′,1→ constr(vψ′,1, t∗))
∨
 enc(t′)  (ϕ[pi, e, 0] ∧ ∧vϕ′,1∈ϕ[pi,e,0] vϕ′,1→ constr(vϕ′,1, t∗))
∧ enc(t′)  (v−ϕU ψ,1 ∧ v−ϕU ψ,1→ constr(v−ϕU ψ,1, t∗))

same as †⇐====⇒ enc(t′)  (ψ[pi, e, 0] ∨ (ϕ[pi, e, 0] ∧ v−ϕU ψ,1))
∧ ∧
vψ′,1∈ψ[pi,e,0]
vψ′,1→ constr(vψ,1, t∗)
∧ ∧
vϕ′,1∈ϕ[pi,e,0]
vϕ′,1→ constr(vϕ′,1, t∗)
∧ v−ϕU ψ,1→ constr(v−ϕU ψ,1, t∗)
⇔ enc(t′)  ϕU ψ[pi, e, 0]
∧ ∧
vφ,1∈ϕU ψ[pi,e,0]
vφ,1→ constr(vφ,1, t∗)
⇔ enc(t′)  constr(ϕU ψ, t)
– ϕ ∧ ψ, ϕ, and ϕRψ are proven analogously.
Corollary 2. For any ∀2HyperLTL formula ∀pi, pi′. ϕ in negation normal form
over atomic propositions AP and any finite traces t, t′ ∈ Σ+ it holds that t′ ∈
Lt(ϕ)⇔ encAP(t′)  constr(ϕˆ, t).
Proof. t′ ∈ Lt(ϕ) Thm1⇐==⇒ t′ LTLfin ϕˆ|pit Lem2⇐==⇒ enc(t′)  constr(ϕˆ, t).
Lemma 4. For any ∀2HyperLTL formula ∀pi, pi′. ϕ in negation normal form
over atomic propositions AP and any finite traces t, t′ ∈ Σ+ it holds that
encAP(t
′) 2 constr(ϕ, t)⇒ ∀t′′ ∈ Σ+. t′ ≤ t′′→ encAP(t′′) 2 constr(ϕ, t).
Proof. We proof this via contradiction. We choose t, t′ as well as ϕ arbitrarily,
but in a way such that enc(t′) 2 constr(ϕ, t) holds. Assume that there exists
a continuation of t′, that we call t′′, for which enc(t′′)  constr(ϕ, t) holds. So
there has to exist a model assigning truth values to the variables in constr(ϕ, t),
such that the constraint system is consistent. From this model we extract all
assigned truths values for positional variables for position |t′| to |t′′| − 1. As t′
is a prefix of t′′, we can use these truth values to construct a valid model for
enc(t′)  constr(ϕ, t), which is a contradiction.
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Fig. 2: Runtime comparison between RVHyper and our constraint-based monitor
on a non-interference specification with traces of varying input size.
Corollary 3. For any ∀2HyperLTL formula ∀pi, pi′. ϕ in negation normal form
over atomic propositions AP and any finite set of finite traces T ∈ P(Σ+) and
finite trace t′ ∈ Σ+ it holds that
t′ ∈
⋂
t∈T
Lt(ϕ) ⇐⇒ encAP(t′) 
∧
t∈T
constr(ϕˆ, t).
Proof. It holds that ∀t, t′ ∈ Σ+. t 6= t′ → constr(ϕ, t) 6= constr(ϕ, t′). Follows
with same reasoning as in earlier proofs combined with Corollary 2.
5 Experimental Evaluation
We implemented two versions of the algorithm presented in this paper. The first
implementation encodes the constraint system as a Boolean satisfiability problem
(SAT), whereas the second one represents it as a (reduced ordered) binary deci-
sion diagram (BDD). The formula rewriting is implemented in a Maude [8] script.
The constraint system is solved by either CryptoMiniSat [23] or CUDD [22]. All
benchmarks were executed on an Intel Core i5-6200U CPU @2.30GHz with 8GB
of RAM. The set of benchmarks chosen for our evaluation is composed out of two
benchmarks presented in earlier publications [12, 13] plus instances of guarded
invariants at which our implementations excels.
Non-interference. Non-interference [16, 19] is an important information flow
policy demanding that an observer of a system cannot infer any high security
input of a system by observing only low security input and output. Reformulated
we could also say that all low security outputs olow have to be equal on all
system executions as long as the low security inputs ilow of those executions are
the same: ∀pi, pi′. (olowpi ↔ olowpi′ )W(ilowpi = ilowpi′ ). This class of benchmarks was
used to evaluated RVHyper [13], an automata-based runtime verification tool
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Fig. 3: Runtime comparison between RVHyper and our constraint-based monitor
on the guarded invariant benchmark with trace lengths 20, 20 bit input size.
Table 1: Average results of our implementation compared to RVHyper on traces
generated from circuit instances. Every instance was run 10 times.
instance # traces length time RVHyper time SAT time BDD
xor1 19 5 12ms 47ms 49ms
xor2 1000 5 16913ms 996ms 1666ms
counter1 961 20 9610ms 8274ms 303ms
counter2 1353 20 19041ms 13772ms 437ms
mux1 1000 5 14924ms 693ms 647ms
mux2 80 5 121ms 79ms 81ms
for HyperLTL formulas. We repeated the experiments and depict the results
in Fig. 2. We choose a trace length of 50 and monitored non-interference on
1000 randomly generated traces, where we distinguish between a 64 bit input
(left) and an 128 bit input (right). For 64 bit input, our BDD implementation
performs comparably well to RVHyper, which statically constructs a monitor
automaton. For 128 bit input, RVHyper was not able to construct the automaton
in reasonable time. Our implementation, however, shows promising results for
this benchmark class that puts the automata-based construction to its limit.
Detecting Spurious Dependencies in Hardware Designs. The problem
whether input signals influence output signals in hardware designs, was con-
sidered in [13]. Formally, we specify this property as the following HyperLTL
formula: ∀pi1∀pi2. (opi1 ↔ opi2)W(ipi1 = ipi2), where i denotes all inputs except
i. Intuitively, the formula asserts that for every two pairs of execution traces
(pi1, pi2) the value of o has to be the same until there is a difference between pi1
and pi2 in the input vector i, i.e., the inputs on which o may depend. We con-
sider the same hardware and specifications as in [13]. The results are depicted in
Table 1. Again, the BDD implementation handles this set of benchmarks well.
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The biggest difference can be seen
between the runtimes for counter2.
This is explained by the fact that
this benchmark demands the high-
est number of observed traces,
and therefore the impact of the
quadratic runtime costs in the num-
ber of traces dominates the re-
sult. We can, in fact, clearly ob-
serve this correlation between the
number of traces and the runtime
on RVHyper’s performance over all
benchmarks. On the other hand
our constraint-based implementa-
tions do not show this behavior.
Guarded Invariants. We consider
a new class of benchmarks, called
guarded invariants, which express a
certain invariant relation between two traces, which are, additionally, guarded
by a precondition. Fig. 3 shows the results of monitoring an arbitrary invariant
P : Σ → B of the following form: ∀pi, pi′. (∨i∈I ipi = ipi′) → (P (pi) ↔ P (pi′)).
Our approach significantly outperforms RVHyper on this benchmark class, as
the conjunct splitting optimization, described in Section 4.1, synergizes well
with SAT-solver implementations.
Atomic Proposition Scalability. While RVHyper is inherently limited in its
scalability concerning formula size as the construction of the deterministic mon-
itor automaton gets increasingly hard, the rewrite-based solution is not affected
by this limitation. To put it to the test we have ran the SAT-based implementa-
tion on guarded invariant formulas with up to 100 different atomic propositions.
Formulas have the form: ∀pi, pi′. (∧nini=1(ini,pi ↔ ini,pi′)) → (∨noutj=1 (outj,pi ↔
outj,pi′)), where nin, nout represents the number of input and output atomic
propositions, respectively. Results can be seen in Fig. 4. Note that RVHyper
already fails to build monitor automata for |nin + nout| > 10.
6 Conclusion
We pursued the success story of rewrite-based monitors for trace properties by
applying the technique to the runtime verification problem of Hyperproperties.
We presented an algorithm that, given a ∀2HyperLTL formula, incrementally
constructs constraints that represent requirements on future traces, instead of
storing traces during runtime. Our evaluation shows that our approach scales in
parameters where existing automata-based approaches reach their limits.
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